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Some  entities  have  traditionally  been  considered  major,  relative  to 
other,  minor  entities.  Arguably,  material  objects  are  core  or  major 
ingredients  of  the  content  of  our  pre-reflective  thought  about  the  world; 
objects  themselves,  or  other  entities,  such  as  subatomic  particles  or 
spatiotemporal worms, are core elements of reflective ontologies, here taken 
to include scientific ontologies. Still other entities are not so central. But the 
major/minor division is, of course, a disputable issue. That some entities are 
metaphysically deemed minor can be traced back to a matter of historical or 
psychological  accident,  given  that  entities  such  as  material  bodies  and 
events, say, are labeled ‘major’ purely because of their conceptual centrality, 
reflecting  perhaps  biological  significance,  or  intrinsic  complexity  and 
interest.  Some other  criteria  for  minority  may  be  invoked:  surfaces,  for 
instance, are lower dimensional entities, relative to material bodies; holes 
are  characterized  by  their  immateriality.  Here  we  choose  to  stay  with 
tradition and consider as minor some entities that are typically considered 
parasitic  upon  material  bodies;  from  this  viewpoint,  key  examples  are 
surfaces, holes, and shadows; other examples include waves and knots; from 
slightly different points of view, events and regions of space may as well be 
counted in. 
Issues about the existence  and the nature of these items can be quite 
general and concern entities other than minor ones. Thus, surfaces, holes 
and  shadows  are  generally  considered  to  be  dependent entities.  General 
issues  about  dependency  (conceptual,  metaphysical,  semantic)  are  not 
specific  to  them, and,  besides,  dependency also applies  to  major  entities 
(thus a material object is said to depend on its parts) and is thus not in itself 
a  mark  of  the  minor.  Some  metaphysical  issues  are  however  more 
idiosyncratic to our subject-matter. What turns out to be interesting is the 
variety of ways in which these items turn out to depend upon other entities. 
Minor  entities  are  also  interesting  because  their  concepts  can  be 
usefully taken to constitute limit cases of certain key concepts. Holes, for 
instance,  can  be  seen  as  degenerate  bodies,  i.e.,  as  bodies  deprived  of 
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material  constitution.  Surfaces  are  again,  but  on  a  different  count, 
degenerate  bodies  –  bodies  with  one  spatial  dimension  stripped  out. 
Studying holes and surfaces, under this view, is to indirectly study material 
bodies, their core sisters. 
 We shall consider three kinds of minor entities – surfaces, holes and 
shadows  –  as  we  take  them  as  representative  of  classes  of  conceptual 
tensions  and  metaphysical  complexities  (although  by  no  means  the 
exclusive  foci  of  these  tensions  and  complexities).  Surfaces  are 
paradigmatic of a tension between concreteness and abstractness; holes of a 
tension between space and objects; and shadows add a dynamic side to these 
both.
Surfaces
Surfaces  exemplify  a  tension  between  the  abstract  and  the  concrete 
(Stroll 1988). They are intrinsically spatial entities as they mark the limits of 
a material object. At the same time the notion of a surface goes beyond a 
pure geometrical characterization, as it is also importantly causal, precisely 
because surfaces mark the outermost limits of objects. Surfaces are where 
action is first exerted on an object, and where the object first reacts. As a 
special  case  perceptual  contact  with  an  object  is  first  and  foremost 
perceptual contact with its surface: We see bodies, in the norm, by seeing 
their surfaces. 
Setting  aside  complaints  to  the  effect  that  the  notion  of  a  surface 
referred to in philosophical discussion is artificially made to lean towards 
the geometrical notion (aptly voiced in Austin’s (1962:100) phrase, “Where 
and what exactly is the surface of a cat?”, intimating that the standards of 
precision  that  apply  to  the  geometrical  notion  may  simply  not  find 
application in the realm of ordinary objects), puzzles about surfaces arise 
from unresolved compromises between the abstract (spatial) aspect of the 
notion and the concrete (causal/material)  aspect.  On the one hand, if  we 
touch or see a gold sphere (Galton 2007), we do indeed touch or see its 
surface, and we touch or see gold. Hence, one can conclude, both the sphere 
and its surface are made of gold. But if surfaces are to be two-dimensional 
entities, then no definite quantity of gold, no matter how small, can qualify 
for constituting a surface. The surface must be made of gold, but cannot. At 
this point we may try to force a solution within a scientific world view and 
assume that the surface is – say – the outermost atom-thin layer of an object: 
only  to  end  up  with  a  one-atom  thick  film,  which  then  possesses  two 
surfaces.  If,  on the other  hand, one rather  considers surfaces as abstract, 
lower-dimensional limits of objects, then one deprives them of the specific 
causal role they have; not being constituted of matter, they cannot be the 
element that supports the interaction with the world outside the object. 
Another  variation  on  the  abstract/concrete  theme  concerns  contact 
between bodies (Varzi 2007.) A cube is superposed to a second cube; they 
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touch,  that  is,  the  relevant  surfaces  are  in  contact.  Surfaces  are  key 
explanatory ingredients of contact but the notion of a surface and the notion 
of  contact  are  not  obviously  well  aligned,  as  testified  by  the  divergent 
accounts of their interrelation (a problem that affects boundaries of various 
type), when it comes to the dense structure of space, i.e., the property such 
that between any two points of space it is always possible to interpolate a 
third, distinct point. Consider our two abutting objects: how can they touch 
each other, if (a) the objects are topologically closed, that is, they have a 
boundary  that  is  located  at  a  definite  point,  and  (b)  between  the  points 
corresponding  to  the  respective  boundaries  it  is  always  possible  to  find 
countless  many  points?  The  worry  about  contact  can  be  considered  an 
artifact of a substantivalist conception of space, according to which space is 
a mind-independent, non material yet physical entity, irreducible to relations 
between objects in it. If space is entity-like, arguably all its parts, included 
points, are real, and the contact worry ensues. 
Dramatic revisions of commonsense have been provided to address the 
worry. Bolzano (1851) dissolved the problem by claiming that one of the 
two bodies in contact possesses a surface and the other doesn’t, a solution in 
line  with  a  point-set  topological  account;  in  order  to  somewhat  save 
ordinary intuitions it can be stated that it is just epistemically beyond reach 
which of the two bodies is surfaceless. Leonardo’s view (1938:75-76) was 
that there is one single surface dividing the two bodies, which belongs to 
neither of them. (It could also be claimed that that very one surface belongs 
to  both,  something  that  is  allegedly made possible  by the  dimensionless 
nature of surfaces.) Finally, Brentano (1976) suggested that there are indeed 
two  surfaces,  one  for  each  object,  taking  up  no  space,  but  spatially 
coincident (think of water as the surface of air, and air as seen from under 
water as the surface of water). 
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 All these account appear quite revisionary, and this indicates the deeply 
instability of intuitions about surfaces. 
Holes
Both  holes  and  surfaces  are  less  abstract  than  numbers  and  less 
ephemeral than thoughts and dreams; but whereas surfaces cause concern 
because of their lower-dimensionality, holes are on this score more regular, 
as they have full three-dimensionality. Their puzzling features come from 
their being a type of privation.
Holes  are  prima  facie  conceptualized  as  negative entities,  as  they 
appear  to  be absences,  or privations inflicted to  an object.  Much as  this 
implicitly  acknowledges  the  process  behind  many  instances  of  hole 
formation, it  does not contribute usefully to the discussion as it is not in 
itself  transparent what absences amount to (and not all  privations in this 
sense are holes, as we do not think of a hole in place of the missing hand of 
a vandalized statue: holes invoke a specific geometry). 
Still  the  metaphor  of  privations  can  be  usefully  employed  for 
characterizing some aspects of holes. Absences are typically local: Jimmy is 
earmarked as absent as he did not go to class, but the President of the US is 
not  so earmarked,  although he did not  go to  class  either,  as  he was not 
supposed to be there. If holes are absences or privations, they are indeed 
local privations of matter; a certain portion of matter was expected to be 
where the hole is. An arbitrarily chosen region of empty sidereal space does 
not count as an absence in this sense; hence it does not count as a hole. 
Holes  are  thus  intimately  tied  to  objects.  At  a  minimum,  holes  are 
existentially dependent on the objects they are in. Prima facie, it looks as if 
this hole could not have been in that object. 
The tie to objects could be taken to be so strong that holes are identified 
not with the empty regions of space they seem to create, but with material 
parts of the object itself – with what Lewis and Lewis (1970) called ‘hole-
linings’, the portions of the object that surround the hole. As there is a hole 
for each hole lining, and there is a lining for each hole, the temptation may 
arise to identify holes with hole linings, revisionary as the account may be. 
This  would  indeed  amount  to  a  materialist  theory  of  holes,  one  that 
incidentally  would dispel the worry with both absences  and abstractions. 
Objections to this view include the fact that countless hole linings line one 
and the same hole,  and that some geometric and functional properties of 
holes cannot easily be rewritten as properties of hole linings. The revision 
may well be metaphysically clean, but proves operationally impractical. At 
least  as  impractical  as  the  hole-eliminativism  recommended  by  Jackson 
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(1977), according to which although holes are not to be identified with hole-
linings, whatever we can say by making reference to we can equally well 
say by referring to hole-linings. 
If  not  material  parts  of  objects,  holes  could  be  “negative”  parts 
(Hofmann and Richards 1985), albeit not of the holed objects itself, but of a 
theoretical entity which occupies the whole of the convex hull of a holed 
object,  intuitively,  the geometrical result  of  “wrapping up” the body and 
filling the whole content of the spatial region so defined.  One (or more) 
parts of this super-object would coincide with its hole(s); these would be 
negative  parts  of  the  super-object,  i.e.,  parts  that  correspond  to  a  local 
privation of matter. The advantage of this conception is that holes are treated 
as any other part, and the simple framework for treating them is mereology, 
restricted to a specific domain. Intuitions about the super-object, however, 
are unstable: is it material through and through, with negative parts as just 
abstractions,  indicating  operations  performed  locally  on  the  matter  the 
super-object is composed of? Or is it partly material and partly immaterial? 
In such a case the account comes close to the immaterial view of holes.
The immaterial view of holes holds that they are immaterial objects, 
whose notion is molded upon that of a material object up to the requirement 
of  material  constitution.  Holes  are then a  subclass  of  ordinary objects  – 
those that are not made of matter (a variant construal is that they are made 
of  space, space being here considered as a peculiar sort of matter, as per 
substantivalist  accounts).  Their  not  being  made  of  matter  (or  their 
insensitivity to matter) explains some of the particular intuitions about their 
identity: filling and emptying a hole does not change or destroy it: a screw is 
kept in place precisely by the geometry of the hole it fills; keeping the hole’s 
geometric  continuity  up  to  topologically  invariant  deformation  makes  it 
survive, and so on. It should however be noted that material constitution 
overdetermines identity intuitions in the case of material objects (witness 
the puzzling reception of Theseus’ ship or of statue/matter cases), whereas 
holes may take advantage of the fact that intuitions about their identity are 
principally  controlled  by  functional  properties  –  as  they  simply  lack  a 
material side. On other accounts the immaterial nature of holes could render 
other intuitions indeterminate, as happens with modal properties of holes. 
Thus  we  said  that  it  is  prima  facie  reasonable  to  claim  that  holes  are 
individually existentially dependent on the objects they are in (“this  hole 
could  not  have  been  in  that  object”),  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  our  modal 
intuitions could be not sufficiently determinate precisely because holes are 
immaterial. 
Of course, being recognized as immaterial, and coincident with regions 
of space, holes can be directly construed as (non-object) bounded regions of 
space;  a  view that  is  open to  the objection that  holes  can move around, 
whereas regions of space cannot. 
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Finally, holes could be not individual, but relations – between an object 
and a region of space. 
An  overarching error account  of holes takes stock of some of these 
difficulties and proposals and must of necessity accompany some of them. 
Accordingly,  holes  would  be  illusions;  mere  projections  of  a  cognitive 
apparatus that deploys ready-made solutions to figure-ground problems and 
represents space as populated primarily by objects. The error account would 
add nothing philosophically interesting to a general projectivist construal of 
material  entities  – and there are indeed reasons to consider  that  material 
bodies  themselves  are  mind-dependent  –  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that 
projectivism about holes could be paired with realism about objects, thereby 
circumscribing metaphysical oddity to a local matter of fact. 
Shadows
Common sense and pictorial practice distinguish between cast shadows, 
those that are projected on walls, and attached shadows, the dark side of 
objects (further complexities can be ignored here); let us just consider cast 
shadows. Shadows are usefully characterized, prima facie, as holes in light; 
they  therefore  inherit  some of  the  metaphysically  interesting  features  of 
holes, whereby the role of the material object host is now taken by light. In 
particular, like holes, shadows are dependent entities, they have location, 
shape and size, and they have individuation principles that mimic those of 
holes (for instance, they can merge and split.)  
However,  shadows have a couple of added complexities,  due to  the 
dynamic  nature  of  light,  and  to  the  more  structured  system  of  their 
dependencies upon other entities (not only upon light itself, but also upon an 
obstacle that blocks light transmission, and upon a screen). Consider them in 
turn.
First, a shadow can only exist because an object, an obtruder, blocks 
light; the obtruder must be exposed to light. It may be left open where the 
cast  shadow “begins”,  whether immediately beneath the lit  up surface or 
immediately beyond the dark surface, i.e. whether the obtruder is spatially 
included or not in the shadow.  (Is the interior of an object shaded by its lit-
up surface?) 
Second, a shadow exists insofar as light is locally missing. And as our 
spontaneous measure of light’s presence or absence is perceptual, access to 
the light-shadow demarcation is typically constitutive of our attribution of 
shadow character to dark zones of our environment (this explains why we 
do not spontaneously conceptualize night as a shadow: we do not see the 
light night is carved into). However not all local deficiencies of light count 
as shadows: traceability back to an obtruder remains a necessary condition. 
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Now, if light is totally prevented from reaching the shadowed area (bar 
physical complications related to scattering) it is indeterminate whether this 
prevention will be exerted indefinitely in space or whether it will stop being 
exercised when the shadow is cast on a screen. There is here an intuition 
that  the  spatial  features  of  shadows  are  supported  by  causal  features, 
however broadly construed. Leonardo claimed (perhaps metaphorically) that 
shadows are carried around by ‘shadow rays,’ the negative counterpart of 
light rays; a modern variant suggests ‘shadowons’, negative counterparts of 
photons  (Talmy  2000:  115).  If  this  were  the  case,  then  one  could  ask 
whether shadow rays penetrate objects or are stopped by them. After all, if a 
shadow ray is the privation of a determinate light ray, then shouldn’t this 
privation extend as far as the light ray would have extended? (Notice the 
analogy with the above question of whether  holes  construed as negative 
parts belong to objects). 
A classical shadow puzzle arises from this indetermination. If in order 
for an object to be able to cast a shadow, it must intercept light, and if the 
local absence of light is indeed stopped by the first screen encountered (the 
one on which we see the shadow projected), then it becomes indeterminate 
which  of  two serially  interposed  obtruders  are  responsible  for  shading  a 
given area. The first in order of distance from the light source, call it A, is 
the one that intercepts light, but then it cannot cast its shadow through the 
second, B (Todes, Daniels 1975). From an observer situated at the screen, it 
is  indeterminate  whether  the  eclipsing  body  is  A  or  B;  and  it  is 
indeterminate whether it is A or B that is seen, assuming that their profiles 
visually  coincide.  Endorsing  Leonardo’s  shadow  rays  only  delays  a 
resolution  of  the  problem:  a  causal  theory  of  perception  must  now 
accommodate  ‘negative  carriers’ (Sorensen  1999)  ultimately  denies  the 
indeterminacy and argues that A is casting the shadow and is seen as it is the 
causal agent, the light blocker. Indeed, dimensions of indeterminacy abound 
for  shadows,  so  much  so  that  even  the  shadow/light  distinction  can  be 
conceptually blurred: if the obtruder is a piece of green glass, its projection 
on the screen (a green expanse) can equally well be considered as a green 
shadow or as a green light spot (Casati 2002). 
Conclusions
The entities described here are all superficial in the sense that they have 
to do with surfaces; this fact shows up in the analysis of their  structure. 
Other minor entities will display other complexities (related to time, in the 
case of events).  Minor entities  are an enrichment of the ontology whose 
benefits appear to outweigh the costs in some cases (especially in terms of 
descriptive  power,  as  it  is  hard  to  describe  a  superficial,  perforated  and 
eclipsed world without referring to surfaces, holes and shadow). In other 
cases, the intrinsic difficulties encountered in the analysis of these entities 
may  prove  too  taxing.  A general,  unified  account  of  the  metaphysically 
interesting  features  of  the  minor  entities  described  here  may  be  beyond 
reach  given  the  peculiarities  of  each  kind.  Still,  some  of  the  tensions 
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documented here may tentatively be ascribed to the fact that the concepts 
we use to  deal  with  surfaces,  holes  and shadows each tap  into different 
representational  systems,  and  thus  generate  not  obviously  compatible 
representations of one and the same entity. The abstract notion of a surface 
could be tributary of a type of spatial representation that undergoes tighter 
constraints  than  the  type  of  causal  representation  that,  supposedly, 
underscores the material-causal conception of a surface. In the case of holes, 
a  tension  arises  between  holes  considered  as  (almost)  objects  and  holes 
considered as (qualified) regions of space; as well as from consideration of 
holes as the result of creating empty space by deleting a portion of an object. 
For shadows, these difficulties are compounded by the intuitive inscription 
of a strong causal component into the behavior of shadows. This component 
is likely to misfire when it comes to describing the ‘interaction’ of a shadow 
with the surface it is cast upon– where the only fact of the matter is the 
absence of an interaction between light and the surface in question. 
Thus,  much as descriptions  of reality in terms of minor  entities  can 
provide useful and poignant shortcuts (for instance, by avoiding complex 
references to the topological structure of the surface of a multiply perforated 
object),  the  underlying  metaphysics  requires  fine-tuning  and adjustments 
that may encounter hard to overcome conceptual limitations. 
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